General Insurance Company v. Christiansen Furniture Co. : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1950
General Insurance Company v. Christiansen
Furniture Co. : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Skeen, Thurman & Worsley; Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, General Insurance Co. v. Christiansen Furniture Co., No. 7459 (Utah Supreme Court, 1950).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1278
.. __ ...., 
Case No. 7 459 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
::GENERAL · INSURANCE ·COM-
·. PANY, 
vs. 
-. 
. 'IOliRISTIANSEN FURNITURE 
·CO., a oo.rporation, 
· Defe'TiiJJam,t and App·ellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
·~.~.·r.t'.. .  ·.··· I 'L' . 'E rJKEEN, THURMAN & WORSLEY, ~l"r · . . At-borweys for·Defentlatnt 
~·· .. ~J~:~•nAY - J 1950 OJYiiL AptpelZ(l(nt. 
l ~'\ii!.lft..t~ . 
~;;~~::_~------------------··-----~---· ':;v~~.,;!ii4ipuz::e uettn; Eliih 
);'f,:\_ "it > ", • I , ,,',~ - <:,\ , ' 
.. 
·' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ff!7F~ENT 01 FACTS•••••••••••·•••••••••• l 
fiJ. 
S! AT fM HfT 0 F' "?: -. I ?r S • • • • • • • • • .. • • •••••• • • • 4 
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1. The C':;urt err·-~i ir1 denJllliJ 4e""t:·rl-
4ant's :~.otlon ror non-t\t1t and d1rtm1•·-
5al (Tr. 99) on the ;;round that the 
9laiat1rr h.a4 tailed to p.rove .!n &lrtue-
mmt to pay rent, or ~:,,t,.ts on which to 
b~ise ?n 1aplied agl'eement t\1 pay rent, 
and the re~sonable rental value ot the 
d&.."U~ec.t 1"r:'.)r:erty •••••••••••••• •....... 5 
2. -there is no e.v1denee in the -record 
or any expreas agreement or the rum.i-
ture CCtlpaay to paJ .eny~-rent nnd there 
is no ~'Yidenee of ~'lP. rr3:nt~~ l value of 
thfl' ~n··t?:d ses a.rter the rtreL or &llJ 
evtdenee at all to sut>nort "1nd1na f)t 
Fact lo. 6 (Tr. ?4), ~hat tne ~~r~ed 
:rental vr s 18'75. J!) per 110nth, tt aad Find-
ins or Pact Mo. 9, {Tr. 25), readinfl 
"The Court finds cenerally in ravor ot 
the pla1nttrf eoryoT".~;tlon snd agai.nst 
the det'endant corport:i:tlon."••••••••••• 17 
3. !hat the-re 1s no finding or evi· 
denee t.o support the Conclu~ion. of' La.v 
No. 1, that pla1nt1rr is e:ntitle·d t.·; a 
judpeat against the defendant in the 
amount ot 11,'750.00 ••••••••••••••••••• 12 
lu !h.~t the ~udpent ~.Wf<:rdi.ng ~,la.1n­
t1 rr $1, '750.00, and ;t;26?. 50 t·Qterest, 
it unsupported by U'l7 tY1denee or Find-
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GENERAL INSURANCE COM-
PANY, 
Plaintiff and ~Respondent, 
vs. 
CHRISTIANSEN FURNITURE 
CO., a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellam..t. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT 
Case No. 
7459 
This action was filed hy the General Insurance 
Company of America, hereinafter referred to as '' Insur-
ance Company," against the Christiansen Furniture 
Company, hereinafter referred to as ''Furniture Com-
pany,'' operating a retail furniture business at 66 South 
Main Street in Salt Lake City. The basis of the com-
plaint is a claim for rent claimed to have accrued dur-
ing two months immediately following destruction of the 
premises by a fire on May 2, 1946. The property is 
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owned by the Rental Investment Company, a Utah 
corporation, and was occupied by the defendant Furni-
ture Company up to the date of the fire under an oral 
month-to-month rental agreement; all rent was paid up 
to the date of the fire. 
The plaintiff Insurance Company paid the Rental 
Investment Company under a rental insurance policy, 
for loss of rent sustained by the Rental Investment 
Company, owner of the said real estate, by reason 
of the building being damaged by fire and the rental 
use by the appellant furniture company being ter-
minated. The plaintiff Insurance Company sues under 
a subrogation agreement made in connection with the 
issuance of its rental income insurance policy. 
The appellant Furniture Company answered, ad-
mitting first the occupancy of the premises prior to the 
fire ; second, the occurrence of the fire on May 2, 1946, 
which fire rendered the place unfit for further use; and 
third, denying that defendant and appellant became 
obligated to pay any rent whatsoever after the date of 
the said fire. 
For some time prior to the fire, the premises had 
been adapted to the use of the Furniture Company and 
used as a retail furniture store, under a month-to-month 
oral agreement to pay $875.00 per month. 
There was no lease, or obligation on the Furniture 
Company to occupy the premises for any specific time or 
period. The fire occurred in the early morning of May 
2, and the owner of the premises, Rental Investment 
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Company, requested the Furniture Company to hold 
eYerything in the pre~nises so as to help in protecting 
the prop€rty until fire adjustment insurance claims 
could be handled. 
The premises were rendered wholly unfit for further 
use as a retail furniture store. Remodelling of the whole 
building was in contemplation. The appellant Furni-
ture Company moved to another building all of its books 
and records, and kept only a desk in the store, with 
signs and an attendant directing people to another build-
ing where the office was .established after the fire. On 
one occasion, for two days, the appellant Furniture 
Company conducted a fire ~sale in the premises. 
The Rental Investment Company and the Furniture 
Company were two separate and distinct corporations. 
The officers of both companies were substantially the 
same. The damaged furniture and furnishings and pro-
perty of the Furniture Company remained in the prem-
Ises. 
The plaintiff sued under the subrogation agreement 
for the full rent, as the rate being paid before the fire 
of $875.00 per month, for two full months after the fire. 
The plaintiff offered no evidence whatever as to any 
specific rental agreement, or as to the reasonable rental 
value of the premises under the existing conditions, as 
a basis for an implied obligation to pay rent. The rental 
prior to the fire was $875.00 per month. The Oourt 
entered judgment for the full amount of $875.00 per 
month for two months, together with interest and costs. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The defendant filed this appeal, and has designated 
and included the entire record, and all the proceedings 
and evidence in the action, and in its appeal relies upon 
the following points : 
1. The Court erred in denying defendant's motion 
for non-suit and dismissal {Tr. 99) on the ground that 
the plaintiff had failed to prove an agreement to pay 
rent, or facts on which to base an implied agreement to 
pay rent, and the reasonable rental value of the damaged 
property. 
2. There is no evidence in the record of any ex-
press agreement of the Furniture Company to pay any 
rent and there is no evidence of the rental value of the 
premises after the fire, or any evidence at all to support 
Finding. of,Fact No.6 (Tr. 24). "That the agreed rental 
was $875.00 pel' month,'' and Finding of Fact No. 9, ( Tr. 
25), reading: ''The Court finds generally in favor of the 
plaintiff corporation and against the defendant corpora-
tion.'' 
· 3. That there is no finding or ·evidence to support 
the Conclusion of Law No. 1, that plaintiff is entitled to 
a judgment. against the defendant in the ·amount of 
$1,750.00.: 
4. That the judgment awarding plaintiff $1,750.00, 
and $262.50 interest, is unsupported by any ·evidence or 
Finding of Fact, and is contrary to the evidence, and 
there is no evidence on which to base any findings to 
support the judgment. 
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ARGU~IENT 
The- pre-trial order (Tr. 15) specified that the only 
issue of fact is the amount of use of the buildings de-
scribed, in the premises that were destroyed by fire, that 
was made by the defendant during the months of May 
and June, 19-±6, and the only question of law presented 
is as to whether a tenant of premises that are damaged 
by fire, who makes use, or some use of the premises, is 
liable for the full amount of the rent and the reasonable 
rental value of the premises, or owes no rent at all. 
In support of point one, that the motion for non-
suit should have been granted, the record affirmatively 
shows there was an agreement that there should be no 
rent obligation. (Tr. 50). 
On the trial of the action before the Ron. John A. 
Hendricks, Judge, Howard Christiansen, President and 
Manager of the appellant Furniture Company, testified 
(Tr. 42) that he was President of both the Rental Invest-
ment Company, owner of the premises, and the Furniture 
Company, appellant tenant (Tr. 43); that the Furniture 
Company occupied the premises as a watchman, to keep 
track of what was left of the damaged merchandise, and 
that on June 24 and 25, a fire sale was held, pursuant to 
an advertise:ment in the Deseret News (Tr. 44); that the 
Rental Investment Company made claims for loss of 
rental against the Insurance Company in the amount of 
$875.00 per month, and the Rental Investment Company 
received a settlement on that basis for the months of May 
and June (Tr. 45). On cross-examination, Mr. Christian-
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sen testified (Tr. 46) that a fire occurred May 2 at 2:15 
A.M.; that when he got to the store the doors were bro-
ken in and everything went up like a flash (Tr. 46); 
that the floor was covered with water; that the entire 
walls were completely wrecked, with the plaster falling 
(Tr. 47). The building was unsafe for customers to get 
in or the general public; that he immediately contacted 
the Insurance Company and then transferred the busi-
ness over to a warehouse at 45 Richards Street, where 
they set up operating headquarters (Tr. 48); that the 
retail furniture business was not continued in the main 
building; that the damaged merchandise was taken out, 
and the Furniture Company merely kept someone at the 
store to receive payments and send others to the tempo-
crary office, and signs were posted to make payments at 
45 Richards Street, the new location (Tr. 49). The front 
door was closed with canvas and boards, and the owner 
of the building instructed the Furniture Company to 
keep a watch at night, and there was an agreement that 
the're would be no rent as long as the damaged premises 
were unoccupied. The premises were unoccupiable during 
the months of May and June (Tr. 50). The Rental In-
vestment Company did remodel, as the owner of the 
building. There was no agreement made at any time 
to pay rent during May and June, and he was requested 
not to move or disturb anything (Tr. 52). The officers 
of both the Furniture Company and the Rental Invest-
ment Company, in a regular meeting, discussed the 
matter of rent, and there was no request or demand made 
upon the Furniture Company to pay, or meet any obliga-
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tion for rent during the month of May or until full occu-
pancy was resumed. 
On re-direct examination, Mr. Christiansen testified, 
giving the names of the officers of the Rental Investment 
Company and of the Furniture Company, that the Furni-
ture Company ceased doing business in the main store, 
but did hold a fire sale, but there was no agreement be-
tween the owner and the tenant to pay Tent, the owner 
making claim under its insurance policy for loss of rent. 
The witness identified certain exhibits, E, F, G, H, I 
and J (Tr. 5-±) as photographs showing· parts of the 
damaged building (Tr. 56). W. H. Shipler testified as 
to the exhibits, photographs taken by him (Tr. 58.) How-
ard A. Christiansen resumed the stand on further cross-
examination (Tr. 58) and testified (Tr. 59) that after 
the fire, on :May 2, negotiations were going on for settle-
ment of a claim made by the Rental Investment Company 
for loss of rent, and that the Furniture Company paid 
rental to the· Rental Investment Company on the new 
location in the warehouse, to which the business office 
was moved the day following the fire. Scott Wetzel 
testified (Tr. 60) as to the general condition of the build-
ing after the fire, and his negotiations for settlement, and 
finally that the $4,000.00 paid under the insurance policy 
to the Rental Investment Company (Tr. 65) was paid 
as a compromise settlement of a claim for seven months' 
loss of rent. He further testified (Tr. 67) that he had 
seen merchandise in the damaged building, and at dif-
ferent times saw employees of the Furniture Company 
in the store. The witness further testified (Tr. 75) that 
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he was unable to make any agreement with respect to 
fixing any amount of rental to be paid by the Furni-
ture Company during any period after May 2, whi~h was 
the date of the fire. 
The matter went into litigation (Tr. 77), and (Tr. 
78} liability under the policy was calculated on the basis 
of the time required to repair the building. The $4,000.00 
paid was on a basis of $875.00 a month for nearly five 
months, on a basis of compromise settlement (Tr. 78, 
There was a substantial amount of water through 
the building, and sawdust was· placed on the floor to 
absorb the water. The witness saw various different em-
ployees of the Furniture Company in the building (Tr. 
80). He could not calculate how the agreed rental was 
divided between the store and the warehouse property. 
Mrs. Merrill testified (Tr. 82, 83) that she visited 
the store on June 24 and saw people there, and purchased 
some furniture at the sale. 
Mrs. Hopkins testified that she was employed by 
the Furniture Company (Tr. 88) and worked on the 
accounts of the company with Mr~ Greenwood, that she 
was there at the time of the fire sale, and saw the 
accounts of the company at the store during the day, but 
they were taken away at night, and that she saw (Tr. 
90, 91) customers make purchases. She simply stayed 
there to keep up contacts with customers. 
Mrs. Ainsworth testified as to visiting the store after 
the fire, and the location of the office desk and type-
writer (Tr. 97). 
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The plaintiff rested, and the defendant (Tr. 99) 
moved for a non-suit, which was denied. Mr. Christian-
sen, a witness for the defendant testified (Tr. 101) as 
follows: 
The Furniture Company, at the time of the fire, 
was occupying the 'building at No. 66 South Main Street, 
Salt Lake City, and was also leasing from the Rental 
Investment Company warehouse space in the rear of the 
furniture building, in no way connected with the retail 
store on Richards Street, and paying therefore $125.00 
per month. The whole Op€ration of the Furniture Com-
pany retail business was located in the Main Street store. 
The Furniture Company had branch stores at Richfield 
and at Ephraim. After the fire, it became necessary to 
move the operations of the retail business to the ware-
house at 45 Richards Street (Tr. 102), and a day or two 
after the fire, the office equipment was moved to the 
warehouse location at 45 Richards . Street. Customers 
were calling for their furniture bought and left for re-
pair, and other furniture in for repair, and to make pay-
ments. From the date of the fire on; the Furniture Com-
pany acted as a watchman for the premises. The matter 
of the Furniture Company continuing in the premises 
was discussed with the officers of the Rental Investment 
Company, and there was no requirement or agr~emerit 
that any rent would be charged or paid for the further 
use or occupation of the premises by the Furniture Com-
pany (Tr. 50 and 106). The witness further testified that 
he had been in the furniture business for many years and 
had rented similar property in Salt Lake City,· and was 
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familiar with the fair rental value of similar property, 
and that under the conditions existing during the months 
of May and June, 1946, the reasonable rental value of the 
premises involved was $50.00 to $75.00 per month. The 
windows and doors of the building were not closed, and it 
would have been necessary to keep a watchman there at 
all times if the Furniture Company had not stayed in the 
premises and acted as a watchman (Tr. 108). The dam-
age was extensive. Plaster was falling and walls were 
cracked, so that everything had to be torn down and re-
built. The Furniture Company got everything out, and 
the contractor then started right out with the work, 
without any delay on its account whatever (Tr. 109). 
On cross-examination, the witness testified that at the 
fire sale in June, about $2,000.00 to $2,500.00 in merchan-
dise was sold (Tr. 110). The Furniture Company had a 
policy of insurance for use and occupation (Tr. 116), 
and was paid for loss under this policy, and the Rental 
Investment Company was paid for loss of rental under 
its policy. The Rental Investment Company deter-
mined what repairs and rebuilding would be done, and 
the Furniture Company was paid under its business in-
surance policy for a loss of income. (Tr.118). 
B. R. Greenwood, a witness called for the defendant, 
(Tr. 120) testified that he was an employee of the Furni-
ture Company, was familiar with the business and the 
occupancy after the fire, that he was familiar with rental 
values, and that in his judgment the reasonable rental 
value of the premises during the months of May and June 
was $50.00 to $75.00 a month. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
Earl B. Bennett (Tr. 129) testified that he was 
employed as a shipping clerk and that he was called to 
locate the electrical shut-off immediately, and that the 
walls were damaged to the extent that it was not suitable 
for continued use. The store was not used for anything 
at the time, and all the business of the Furniture Com-
pany was carried on from the warehouse, except a fire 
sale for a day and a half. 
We have detailed the evidence to make clear the 
basis of this appeal. The whole theory of the complaint 
was damages for breach of contract of the Furniture 
Company to pay rent. Paragraph 3 of the complaint 
alleges that the Furniture Company ''occupied said 
premises as a tenant under an oral month-to-month 
rental agreement* * * *. '' The complaint then alleges 
the fire, and that the Furniture Company ''continued to 
occupy said premises as tenant,'' and further, that on 
or about July 2, 1946, the Furniture Company "vacated 
said premises, and ever since has failed and refused to 
pay the agreed rental of $875.00 per month * * *. '' 
We take the position that the evidence wholly failed 
to establish any agreement, after the changed conditions 
due to the fire on May 2, of the Furniture Company to pay 
rent. The uncontradicted evidence of the witness, Chris-
tiansen, as above pointed out, is that there was no agree-
ment to pay rent after the fire, and that no demand for 
the payment of rent was ever made by the landlord. The 
plaintiff therefore wholly failed in his proof, and the 
Court should have sustained the defendant's motion for 
non-suit and dismissal at the eiose of the plaintiffs evi-
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dence. .The plaintiff sued. on the express. agreem~nt to 
pay rent, and did J;lOt seek to amend his ple~ding t~ s~ek 
a judgment on an implied agreement, and even ·if this 
application to amend hadheen made, plaintiff had pro-
duced no evidence to justify or support such amendment 
or recovery on the theory of implied agreement and 
quantum meruit. 
Passing on to points 2, 3 and 4, which we will con-
sider and discuss together, that there was no evidence to 
support the finding of an express agreement or an im-
plied agreement to pay rent, and no evidence and no find-
ing to support the judgment for $1750 rent for two 
months, we again urge that the theory of the action 
is breach of an express agreement, and that there is 
no evidence to support this theory, all of the evidence 
of the defendant on this point being to the contrary. 
Again we assert that plaintiff did not seek to change 
his theory and recover on a quantum meruit, and 
again assert that even had he done so, there still was 
no evidence in the record on which the Court could 
find the reasonable rental value of the premises to 
be $875.00 per month. Further, the Court did not attempt 
to make any such finding. Surely, the bald Finding No. 
9,- ''The Court finds generally in favor of the plaintiff 
corporation, and against the defendant corporation,'' 
could not be so construed. 'The Court did close Finding 
No. 6 with the words ''that the agreed rental was $875.00 
p·er month.'' We refer back to our previous statement, 
and re-assert that this is wholly without support in the 
evidence .. 
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We have been unable to find any case or principle of 
law, applied, which could be pointed to as supporting 
this judgment, and we seriously doubt that counsel for 
responde:nt, applying even greater diligenc·e, can do so. 
We find one analogy in the bankruptcy cases where, upon 
bankruptcy, a lease is terminated and the Trnstee holds 
over during the course of liquidation, as the Bank-
ruptcy Act contemplates. The Courts there say that 
under the changed conditions, the Trustee or Receiver 
is obligated to pay only reasonable rent, and the agreed 
rental in the lease is only some evidence of what is rea-
sonable rent. We call the Court's attention to the case 
of Crook v. Zorn, 100 F. (2d) 792, where the Court says: 
''There being no express contract of rental, 
and no claim that the relationship of landlord 
and tenant existed, the rights of the parties are 
fixed by law. Section 62 of the Bankruptcy Act, 
11 USC A, Section 102, provides for payment 
from the estate of the actual and ne~essary ex-
penses incurred. * * * N ecessa:ry expense in this 
connection is the cost of preserving the property. 
The full rental value of the entire building would 
have very little weight in determining the amount 
of this necessary expense, and there was no evi.,. 
dence bfore the court below upon which to base 
a finding as to a reasonable storage charge. There 
being no claim for storage and no evidence tend-
ing _to prove what amount . would be fair and 
reasonable in the circumstances, the Court did 
not err in denying the rental claim entirely." · 
We refer the Court also to In re Millards, Inc., 41 
F. ( 2d) 498. In this case, similar circumstances existed. 
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The Receiver and Trustee occupied the premises after 
bankruptcy, mainly for storage purposes, and the land-
lord presented a claim for rent on a basis of a lease. 
The Court, in denying this claim and fixing a lesser 
amount, stated, at Page 499: 
''The fair rental value of such property 
cannot be tested by its value for such a use or 
for storage purposes. If storage was the only 
purpose of retaining it, the stock might have 
been taken to distinctly storage premises at very 
much lower rate. Nor is it material that some 
time would be required to prepare the property 
for another tenant, or that another tenant was 
not immediately on hand to take the premises. 
There was no basis in the facts, nor under the 
law, for applying the first year's rent rate un-
der the lease to the period in question.'' 
We respectfully submit that each of the points of 
error is well taken, and should be sustained, and the 
judgment of the trial court reversed, with direction to 
enter judgment in favor of the defendant with costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, THURMAN & WORSLEY, 
Attorneys for /)efendant 
and A. ppelloot. 
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